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Abstract:
In this paper, we analyse and compare the various institutional models and 
regulatory arrangements that have recently emerged from the restructuring of 
European passenger rail industries and, more specifically, the contractual 
agreements giving concrete expression to these policies. To do so, we developed a 
systemic framework consisting of seven key dimensions: the Decentralisation of 
regulatory control, the Disintegration of the industry, the Domain of the 
contractual assignment, the Discretion of management, the Distribution of risks, 
theDuration of contracts, and the Destination of subsidies. 
W e use empirical material gathered on the passenger rail industries of five EU 
Member States, i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden, as 
well as extrapolation to highlight the most likely costs and benefits (incentive 
properties) associated with alternative arrangements and contract features and to 
show how the above dimensions, which are connected with one another in a 
complex web of interactions,  can be traded-off against one another in order to 
optimize the industry’s performance. 
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21. Introduction
European passenger railways have just entered a new era of reforms and restructuring 
that are gradually leading to the emergence throughout the EU of a variety of 
institutional regimes, organisational structures, and regulatory arrangements. In some 
countries, the planned changes have only just started to be translated into practical 
regulatory instruments. Partial assessments of the first national experiences have 
started to appear in the literature. The British model, in particular, has already given 
rise to a number of articles (see, for example, Else, 1996; Preston, 1996; Nash, 1993 
and 1997; White, 1998). So have the Swedish (Larsson and Ekström, 1993, Hansson 
and Nilsson, 1991), the German (Bowers, 1996; Wolf, 1996) and the French (Crozet 
and Heroin, 1998) experiences. However, apart from an international study of the 
separation of infrastructure provision and use by Brooks and Button (1995), 
systematic cross-country comparisons of alternative organisational and regulatory 
schemes have yet to be undertaken. 
The reforms carried out in a few countries’ bus and coach industries provided 
researchers and decision-makers with valuable insights for understanding passenger 
rail reforms. The study of the British experience with bus deregulation in and outside 
London, in particular, helped authors to highlight some of the most pressing issues 
arising from this process. (White, 1995, 1997a, and 1997b; White and tough, 1995; 
Mackie, Preston and Nash, 1995; Savage, 1993). However, in this case also, cross-
country comparisons remain a rarity (White, 1997b; Banister, Berechman and de 
Rus, 1992; Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez, 1991). Finally, even when they have not 
focused on one particular country or case study, most authors have essentially 
limited their analysis to one out of a number of issues arising from deregulation in 
land passenger transport (Beesley, 1990). One notable exception in both respects is 
provided by Van de Velde and Sleuwaegen (1997). 
In effect, it is still too early to venture in any detailed ex post cross-country 
evaluation of passenger rail reforms. This paper provides a comprehensive 
framework for analysing and comparing alternative institutional and organisational 
schemes and to pinpoint, ex-ante, the most striking potentialities and weaknesses of 
the various models now emerging in the EU. Our study draws from an analysis of the 
reforms carried out in five countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and 
Sweden. It is based on a variety of authoritative opinions and documents obtained 
from a variety of sources. Part of our research material consists of interviews with 
the representatives in Brussels of the networks and railway companies constituting 
the core of our sample. In order to extend the scope of our research beyond the 
national railway companies with representative offices in Brussels, we also carried 
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material was gathered from the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) and 
the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR), the two specialised bodies in charge of rail 
transport regulation nation-wide. 
Our inquiry mainly targeted railways operators, transport ministries, regulatory 
agencies and public transport authorities. It substantially complemented the 
documents and interviews gathered in Brussels and allowed us to come out with a 
rather diverse collection of documents, industry overviews, calls for tender, model 
offers, franchise agreements, performance contracts, etc. In our opinion, the number 
of answers we received reflects the interest of the parties involved in the topic 
covered in this study. 
This paper unfolds as follows. Drawing form the case studies carried out in the 
framework of this research, section 2 identifies seven decisive dimensions or 
variables along which the main distinctive models can be consistently analysed and 
compared. This allows us to highlight in a most concise way, the key characteristics 
of each of the models examined. In section 3, we discuss in turn the seven major 
variables pointed out in section 2, focusing on their multiple and complex 
interactions, and we use them to carry out a comparison of European regulatory 
practices. Section 4 rounds off this paper with a few concluding comments and 
thoughts on promising directions for further research. 
2. In search of a comprehensive analytical framework:  
 the "7 Ds" of passenger rail contracting
Until fairly recently, nearly all railway companies in Europe were State-owned, fully 
integrated, and administered in pretty much the same way as a State department. In 
some cases, there existed no clear separation of accounts between infrastructure 
development and maintenance, and the various categories of transport services. 
Besides, national railway monopolies sometimes enjoyed limited managerial 
autonomy vis-à-vis their respective governments. 
These particular status and hierarchical governance mechanisms, combined with the 
usually considerable size of railway companies, led to the European railways not 
always responding with the necessary acumen and customer-mindedness to the 
business challenges they were facing. The steady decline in their market shares over 
the last decades, and the worrying development of car ridership, made it clear that 
important reforms were needed if one wanted to avoid disastrous environmental and 
economic consequences in the future. 
The European legislation on passenger rail transport, which is partially responsible 
for some of the current reforms, allows some diversity in their design and 
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is certainly one noticeable characteristic of the sector. Another one is the instability 
of its organisation and governance structures. It seems that most countries are still 
looking for the most appropriate "track" towards railway restructuring. For these 
reasons, it has become very difficult to offer a synoptic perspective on the various 
organisational structures characterising passenger rail industries across Europe. 
In the figure below, we provide an essentially static EU-wide overview of the 
sector's organisation, focusing on two fundamental dimensions. The vertical axis 
refers to the vertical separation of the sector. In accordance with the possibilities 
outlined in Directive 91/440, it specifies the type of separation implemented. It goes 
from full vertical integration (that is, no separation, a possibility now precluded by 
the European legislation) to institutional separation. The horizontal axis represents 
the form of access to the different national networks opened to third parties. The 
larger arrows indicate the impact of the European legislation on the sector's 
organisation with the double lines delimiting the possibilities left open to national 
regulators and operators. 
Fig. 1: A synoptic presentation of the deregulation 
 of passenger rail in the EU. 
Note: This is a revised version of a diagram featured in Debande and Monami, 1996. 
Not only do we now have to do with a variety of national approaches to rail transport 
reform, in a number of countries, two or more institutional arrangements may 
perfectly coexist. While Belgium is still relying nation-wide on a single service 
provider supervised by means of a unified and centralised regulatory regime, in other 
cases, namely France, Germany and Sweden, it has become necessary to distinguish 
the regulatory regime applicable to international and main line services from the 
arrangements adopted by lower levels of government in their provision or sub-
contracting of local public transportation. Finally, the British model, though it 
involves the widest and most diversified array of participants and interorganisational 
relationships, remains relatively homogeneous in the sense that it consists of a 
continuum of more or less constraining arrangements. 
One of the main differences between the various models now existing lies in their 
respective exposure to competitive forces and in the way competition is actually 
brought into the picture. In some cases, the rules of the game, that is, the standards of 
service and/or the corresponding financial conditions are agreed upon after 
completion of sophisticated tender procedures and are consequently shaped by 
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between a persistently unique railway operator and the regulator. 
However, the methods and instruments used across the EU to regulate passenger rail 
operations have at least something in common. With the notable and probably 
temporary exception of a fraction of German and Swedish local traffic operations and 
of SJ's profitable services, contractual agreements now govern the relationship 
between operators and European public authorities, be they national, regional, or 
local. Contracts indeed appear to be relevant to a wide array of regulatory options, 
ranging from the tendering of local franchises in Great Britain to the formalisation of 
an essentially bilateral agreement between the State and a vertically integrated State-
owned operator in Belgium. 
This commonality allows us to propose a common framework for analysing and 
comparing particularly diverse European regulatory practices and institutional 
arrangements. Our ultimate focus in this endeavour is on the costs and benefits 
(incentive properties) associated with alternative arrangements and contract features 
and how they are likely to influence the regulated firms’ performance. A detailed 
examination of the contractual and quasi-contractual service agreements reviewed in 
the framework of this research suggests that it is possible to encompass all the 
important issues using seven fundamental dimensions or variables. These 
dimensions, which could be referred to as the "7 Ds" of passenger rail contracting, 
are the following: decentralisation of regulatory control, disintegration of the 
industry, domain of the contractual assignment, discretion of management, 
distribution of risks, destination of subsidies, and duration of contract. Before we use 
the 7 Ds to provide a synthetic description of the different models, let us briefly 
specify what each of the singled out dimensions represents. 
i) Decentralisation of regulatory control 
In several European countries, the responsibility for passenger rail regulation and 
financing is increasingly being shifted from their central governments towards lower 
levels of administration. Interestingly, the decentralisation of regulatory control 
allowed the emergence in some countries of fairly distinctive regulatory approaches 
and arrangements. Some of these distinctions will be examined in the next section. 
We shall also discuss the consequences that the decentralisation of regulatory 
responsibilities could have on service performance, on the one hand, and on the cost 
of control, on the other hand. 
ii) Disintegration of the industry 
The institutional unbundling of formerly integrated railway companies, vertically 
and, in three of the countries studied, horizontally, represents a real revolution for 
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of separation. Despite its advantages - i.e. the replacement of a big and allegedly 
bureaucratic company by a set of smaller and hopefully more dynamic organisations, 
the introduction of more transparent arrangements for the financing of non profitable 
public service operations, the more effective opening of the sector to new entrants, 
etc. - it raises serious difficulties. 
iii) Domain of the contractual assignment 
Whatever their legal and institutional status (franchise agreements, performance 
contracts, etc.), the primary role of contracts is to define the mutual obligations of 
the parties. Contracts somehow specify the assignments of the operator, in particular 
its public service requirements, and, where considered appropriate, stipulate the 
public funding awarded in compensation for completing these assignments. 
The domain of intervention left to the management of the regulated operator is the 
scope of the company’s responsibilities, that is, the theoretical extent of its 
intervention in service design and delivery. As a contractual dimension, the 
operator's domain of action is both a critical feature and a source of particularly 
heterogeneous applications on the field. This is especially true for what concerns the 
geographical scope of the contracted services - i.e. the complexity of the track 
network on which the company operates - and the functional scope of the assignment 
- e.g. the role it plays in services planning, design, and delivery. Note the distinction 
we make between this issue and another important dimension (discussed below), the 
"discretion of management", which refers to the judgement effectively left to the 
company’s management in fulfilling their mission, whatever its extent. 
iv) Discretion of management 
By "discretion of management", we mean the room to manoeuvre effectively left to 
the operator’s management under the terms of the contractual agreement as well as in 
practice. This dimension is thus concerned with the judgement really left to the 
company in achieving its goals. The discretion of management should not be 
mistaken for the dimension examined in the preceding subsection, although they are 
very closely connected. A fairly confined functional assignment may still leave to the 
operator to decide on how to fulfil its obligations. On the other hand, a fairly 
extended and functionally broad mission may be accompanied by such an abundance 
of recommendations and interference by the regulatory body supervising operations 
that the contractor is eventually left with very few decisions to take. These 
dimensions are therefore complementary because forcing managers to simply operate 
a pre-set process, whose components are determined by outsiders, or interfering in all 
their decisions both come down to negating their responsibility for running the firm. 
7v) Distribution of risks 
Insofar as contracts consist of commitments, they go hand in hand with certain risks. 
These risks mainly result from the impossibility to foresee all future contingencies. 
These uncertainties would not cause any regulatory difficulty if the efforts made by 
the regulated operator were not also unverifiable to a certain extent. These 
informational problems involve moral hazard, that is, the operator is in a position to 
blame its possible failure to meet the agreed requirements on exogenous 
contingencies. The risks involved in passenger rail contracting can be classified into 
two broad categories. Industrial or production risks pertain to the costs involved in 
producing a given output. Commercial or revenue risks are associated with the 
turnover obtained from the sale of this output. 
vi) Duration of contracts 
Another interesting dimension of recent passenger rail reforms is that of contract 
duration. The recurrence of contract negotiations and/or tendering procedures to 
which it is directly related has vital consequences on the structure of the concerned 
industries as well as on the way the contracts themselves should be drafted. 
vii) Destination of subsidies 
This dimension deals with the issue of public money allocation in fragmented 
passenger rail industries. As we are about to illustrate, different options exist which 
bring about completely different challenges and promises. 
To conclude the present section on the various dimensions along which the 
regulation and organisation of passenger rail throughout the European Union can be 
analysed, the table below uses these dimensions to summarise the different models. 
Fig. 2: An institutional and organisational comparison 
 of five European passenger rail industries. 
3. Discussion
In this section, we analyse the impacts that the options chosen by policy-makers with 
respect to each of the highlighted dimensions are likely to have on the performance 
of the system in general, and on service quality, in particular. In this process, we 
insist on the multiple and complex connections that exist between the different 
variables and show how one decision regarding one of them in particular may 
influence or need to be balanced by another one. Because their respective impacts on 
the industry's performance are intricately intertwined, the following presentation is a 
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between them and a consideration for brevity. In any case, we round off this 
discussion with a diagram outlining the main issues raised throughout this analysis. 
i) Decentralisation of regulatory control 
The decentralisation of passenger transport provision is likely to deliver a number of 
positive contributions to the sector's performance. As was suggested by the 
examination of the French, German and Swedish experiences, the decentralisation of 
regulation at regional and local levels allows for more flexibility in the design of 
operations and for a better adaptation to local needs in the planning of transport 
services. Moreover, with the regulatory and financing responsibilities now taken 
closer to the actual service delivery, new opportunities exist for local policy-makers 
and regulators to try out different ways to promote higher service performance. 
First, in a number of cases in Germany and Sweden, local public transport operations 
are still carried out by a PTA or in close collaboration with one, without recourse to 
any formal contractual agreement. In such cases, consensual or hierarchical forms of 
control largely prevail. These informal arrangements are either relatively 
insignificant or mostly temporary. So, we won’t cover them in more details. 
Second, in those German and Swedish cases where formal contracts were adopted 
(with or without invitation to tender), very simple and concise contractual 
agreements usually emerged. (One notable exception is the tender that was organised 
by the Greater Stockholm PTA for its "Roslagsbanan" line.) A relatively minimalist 
specification of service standards is facilitated by the relative simplicity of the 
network and service-mix involved as well as by the proximity of the competent 
regulators and their awareness of the service benchmarks informally set by the 
previous regulatory regime. No doubt this proximity helps service inspection and 
allows an easier detection of any major service flaw. Naturally, for corrective actions 
to be enforceable in case of dissatisfaction, other circumstances or contract 
characteristics may be necessary, which we examine in more details in subsequent 
subsections. Limited contract durations are an important factor. But the way the risks 
involved are distributed between the parties also matters. 
Finally, in the French experience as well as in the Swedish "Roslagsbanan" case, the 
decentralisation of the regulatory process may be considered to have facilitated the 
development of particularly innovative and audacious contractual provisions. More 
specifically, the result-based service standards and the incentive mechanisms 
incorporated in the corresponding agreements could so far never be enforced at the 
national level (despite attempts reported in France as well as in Belgium) because the 
risks and the tensions involved for the operator, and indirectly for the social planners 
themselves, would be commensurate to the bigger scale of operations. The 
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its negotiators and managers to spread over these different contracts the risks 
involved in the commitments they are making in the name of the company. 
The prevalence of one or the other of these three models is very much related to the 
scope of the contractual assignment, if any, and to the discretion left to the operator 
in the delivery of its services. So, we shall definitely come back on these aspects of 
local service agreements in the relevant subsections. 
Whatever its advantages, the decentralisation process also involves its share of 
challenges. First, the multiple separation of the sector's missions and resources raises 
concerns as to the appropriateness of these missions' financing. In particular, are the 
budgeted compensations always adequate to at least secure the current levels of 
service in the longer run? In this respect, the approach adopted in France and 
Germany, which consisted in sharing between the experimental regions and Länder 
part of the responsibility for passenger rail financing without altering the total budget 
awarded to the sector, is in sharp contrast with the British approach, where the 
primary objective of the national franchising authority clearly was to reduce the 
sector’s public financing, with the possibility for local authorities to finance 
supplementary service agreements "out of their own pocket". Although the answer to 
this question is essentially a matter of political decision, it is important to underline 
the fact that decentralisation therefore involves the risk of a loss of homogeneity in 
the provision of public transport over the territory of a country. 
Second, in most cases, the reforms resulted in the active implication of more 
distinctive actors - regulators and, sometimes, service providers (see 
"disintegration") - in the functioning of the sector. The new organisational structures 
set up in the framework of these reforms require thoughtful consideration of the best 
way to distribute among the different players the prerogatives and missions involved 
in the functioning of the sector. Moreover, the advantages of a better tailoring of 
transport services to local needs must be weighed up against the resulting transaction 
costs, that is, against the challenges and coordination costs inhering in the planning 
of an integrated public transport system composed of more independent participants 
than used to be the case. To start with, the net outcome of these reforms will thus 
depend heavily on how effective and costly the cooperation and coordination 
between the different planners involved will be. 
Finally, and more specifically, the German model for regional services, with its close 
involvement of public authorities alongside operators in the planning and design of 
local public transport, raises concerns that Verkehrsverbünde might turn out to be the 
ideal setting for substantial regulatory capture although, we must admit, we cannot 
provide any evidence suggesting that capture be prevailing. Note, however, that, all 
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other circumstances being equal, these fears are rather mitigated than amplified by 
the decentralisation of regulatory control. Indeed, the closer implication of public 
authorities alongside actual service providers in lower levels of government 
coincides with higher levels of citizen vigilance and participation which may be 
expected to result in more democratic pressure towards effective regulation. In any 
case, the risk of capture inherent in the active and permanent involvement of PTAs 
should be balanced with the benefits expected from this involvement in terms of 
cooperation and coordination between modes. 
ii) Disintegration of the industry 
To a number of Member States, the separation of infrastructure management from 
traffic operations appears to be a necessary condition in order to forcibly open access 
to their national network, not only to international groupings providing international 
transport services, but also, in an attempt to introduce competition at the traffic 
operations' level, to other operators for domestic services (which at the industry 
level, would come down to a horizontal separation). Clearly, where this is the 
objective, what matters is the impartiality of the body granting train operators access 
to the tracks. Observers contend that, compared to the Swedish model (which is 
already institutionally unbundled), the German model, despite its opening to new 
entrants, could fail to deliver in this respect, because the infrastructure department, 
where the allocation of train paths is coordinated, is not sufficiently independent yet. 
In our opinion, however, neither is institutional separation the seal of impartiality 
many believe. Indeed, whatever the organisational structure adopted in each country, 
political interference in the sector is likely to remain strong in the years to come. The 
only satisfactory solution may therefore turn out to lie in the development, the 
adoption and the enforcement Europe-wide of a common code of conduct. Moreover, 
with the intensification of international rail relations, this code might have to be 
supplemented by the creation of a European arbitration or track allocation body, 
which could be based on the model provided by Eurocontrol in air transport. 
A second matter of concern, which is closely connected with the destination of 
subsidies inside the industry, is the financing of the different participants. The 
vertical unbundling of natural monopolies almost necessarily requires regulatory 
intervention if only to ensure that the different entities resulting from the separation 
are adequately financed. As illustrated by the British model, passenger rail is no 
exception. For obvious practical reasons, fares may only be collected at one level of 
activity and must then be shared across the whole industry. If competition cannot be 
introduced at all levels, there are strong presumptions that not all the participants 
will spontaneously follow marginal cost pricing principles, or the second best option 
in case of scale economies, when dealing with others lower down the industry’s 
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organisational chart. Therefore, in order to prevent the former from charging 
excessive fees to the latter, regulatory measures need to be enforced with respect to 
intermediate pricing systems. 
In a similar vein, more regulatory interference could be required on issues of intra-
industry resources allocation if the British and Swedish governments were to proceed 
with their intention to enforce a system of competition on the track in their respective 
countries. As was well illustrated by the deregulation of the coach industry in Great 
Britain outside London, the reason for this is that free access to the market will 
otherwise jeopardise the financing of those services whose commercial prospects are 
the poorest. Indeed, under a regime of exclusive rights, the existence of internal 
spill-over effects may prompt even a profit-maximising operator to provide services 
though individually unprofitable because of their positive net contribution to the 
overall profitability (or attractiveness) of their service-mix. But where several 
operators compete for the most profitable services, part of the benefits derived from 
off-peak and feeder services become externalised. Therefore, unless some sort of 
coordination is introduced by an authority at the expense of yet higher regulatory 
costs (or by the operators themselves by way of collusion), these network 
externalities or spillovers are most likely, all other things being equal, to give rise to 
service-mix contractions, that is, to sacrifices in terms of availability and equality of 
access. 
Besides service planning issues, the delivery of high quality services also rests on the 
capacity of service providers to guarantee high standards of quality at all production 
stages and to ensure compatibility between them. The vertical separation probably 
poses more complex problems in this respect. The reason for this is that in the case 
of horizontal separation, all the parties have the same incentives to co-operate and 
co-ordinate their operations, provided the different organisations involved never 
come in direct competition with one another (which is sometimes already the case in 
Great Britain with the possible drawbacks already pinpointed). In case of vertical 
separation, the different independent organisations making up the sector are more 
likely to come into conflict with each other. We have already quoted the possible 
problems raised by the distribution of the sector's revenues. Several authors also 
rightly question the demand-/customer-mindedness of the company (or companies, in 
the British case) responsible for the development, maintenance and exploitation of 
the railway infrastructure. With the institutional vertical disintegration of the 
industry, the responsiveness of infrastructure managers to customer needs is not 
guaranteed, they argue. In this respect too, the outcome will greatly depend on the 
coordination and financial arrangements implemented. In Great Britain, where the 
management of infrastructure accrues to a private firm, essentially financed by the 
contributions received from track users, the problem will consist in controlling 
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Railtrack’s monopoly rents and in safeguarding the interests of rural public service 
users. In Sweden, on the other hand, the rail industry’s performance will heavily 
depend on the efficiency and effectiveness instilled into the State-owned Banverket. 
In all these cases, transaction costs arise due to the greater difficulties and costs 
resulting from the need (and the possible failures) to coordinate the various activities 
making up the service production process between independent organisations rather 
than within the boundaries of a single integrated company. And the significance of 
transaction costs is all the more critical as the vertical unbundling of the sector is 
sometimes complemented with a certain degree of horizontal separation. When 
different train operators run services on distinctive sections of the rail network, the 
problem is merely a matter of optimising connections for customers. But when two 
different train operators use the same stretch of track, it becomes a question of traffic 
safety and maximisation of infrastructure utilisation. 
At this early stage in the various national experiments with open access procedures, 
it is impossible to predict which side or set of arguments will eventually dominate 
the other in this debate. But it is essential, at the outset, to clarify the issues at stake 
and to weigh them up against each other when the time comes. Moreover, when 
assessing the appropriateness of a fragmentation and of a liberalisation of a national 
rail industry, it is important to account for the size of the country considered as well 
as for the competitiveness of its input markets. 
iii) Domain of the contractual assignment 
The domain of the contractual assignment is not always explicitly specified in 
service contracts. However, it can generally be inferred using two distinctive criteria. 
One is the way the service standards expected from the operator are specified; is it in 
terms of pre-established traffic output or in a way that leaves him more autonomy. 
The other one is based on what the incentives incorporated in the contract, which are 
closely connected with the risks supported by the operator, tell about the regulators’ 
expectations with respect to the operator ’s assignment. As will be further discussed 
in the two following subsections, these two criteria may substitute for each other to a 
certain extent. This is well illustrated by the different regional regulatory regimes we 
examined. A comparison focusing notably on these dimensions is provided in the 
next subsection. 
Two other important points need to be made about these aspects and their 
connections with the scope of the contractual assignment. First, these connections 
call for a consistent approach to the drafting of contracts. The way the mission of the 
operator is specified and the incentives incorporated in the contract should be 
congruent with the domain of intervention assigned to the operator. It is not always 
the case. In the performance contracts used in Belgium and, not so long ago, in 
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France at the national level, for example, contradictions exist between these criteria. 
These contradictions constitute one of the most significant weaknesses of these 
instruments. Second, the definition of the parties’ respective domains of intervention 
should take into account, as always, among other dimensions and in a dynamic 
perspective, their specific competence, their access to market information, etc. 
Practically, the geographical and/or functional scope of service contracts may have to 
be limited in some countries by lack of a sufficient number of firms willing or being 
able to bid for greater assignments. Moreover, this type of constraint may well ease 
off or amplify over time. 
The issue is worth trying to come up with a more comprehensive framework than the 
one provided by the case studies examined in this essay. To better understand where 
the existing models differ and to allow for a synoptic presentation of any possible 
alternative, it seems necessary to break up the sector's functioning into its component 
activities and to make it easy to associate each of these activities with one of the 
parties or decision-making levels involved in particular as demonstrated by Van de 
Velde (1997). 
Finally, the domain of the contractual assignment influences the likely costs of 
switching from one supplier to the other in terms of service disruption and 
instability. In contrast, where all the planning remains in the province of the 
contracting authority, the replacement of the operator is barely noticeable to 
customers.
iv) Discretion of management 
At present, a number of local railways are still directly run by local authorities in 
Sweden, Germany, as well as in Great Britain, if we consider urban systems. Others, 
again in Germany, are exploited by fairly distinctive public or private firms but their 
managerial autonomy with respect to their local government is not self-speaking. In 
the face of situations like these, one widely accepted and prominent rationale for 
contractual and quasi-contractual approaches is precisely to ensure that regulators do 
not seek involvement in how the objectives assigned to the firm are being carried 
out. The goal of contracts is indeed in principle to achieve exactly the opposite, that 
is, to clearly identify the parties’ respective responsibilities so as to let them focus on 
what they normally do best. For the regulated operator, the main interest of contracts 
is therefore that they force politicians and regulators on the one hand, to reassess and 
possibly refocus their own objectives, and on the other hand, to commit steadily in 
the allocation of a given funding package to the regulated firm. This commitment 
reduces the firm's uncertainty with respect to the financial interventions it can expect 
from the State, but where all contractual provisions are systematically enforced, it 
can also mean the end of softer budget constraints. 
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These principles notably led to the introduction of performance contracts in France 
and Belgium. The idea is that, once their missions are clearly set, operators may be 
left with more discretion and autonomy in deciding on how to allocate their resources 
and what tactics to implement in order to achieve their assigned objectives with 
maximum efficiency. 
In the contract par excellence, it is normally the end result that counts. Naturally, 
reality is not always that simple and clear-cut. The discretion left to the operator is 
constrained by the other dimensions characterising the contractual relationship 
because, like other dimensions, it is connected with the risks inherent to the contract. 
The more discretion a contract leaves to the operator, the higher the uncertainty 
inherent to the fulfilment of this contract. As a rule, there is therefore a trade-off 
between the risks and uncertainty involved in refraining from interfering in the 
operator’s process decisions and those involved in the other contractual dimensions 
pinpointed in this section. As there is a trade-off between the incentives (in the most 
general meaning of the word) or performance drives inherent to each and every 
dimension. We elaborate on the issue of risks in the next subsection. 
The points just made about the domain of the contractual assignment and the 
discretion left to the operator in fulfilling its mission constitute an important lesson 
to be learned from our international comparison of regulatory regimes in EU 
passenger rail industries. A superficial review of regulatory practices might have 
given the impression that Germany and Sweden, where tendering is taking ground at 
the local level, engaged in particularly radical deregulation measures. But a more 
systematic investigation into what responsibilities are contracted out (domain), and 
how much discretion is really left to the operator in practice, calls for a qualification 
of this impression. 
Let us start with the Swedish model for regional traffic operations. We have seen that 
many PTAs still take full responsibility for the delivery of local public transport. In 
the absence of a distinction between regulation and production, the domain issue is 
non-applicable. Where such a distinction already exists, the emphasis of the 
tendering process is clearly on efficiency enhancement. The utilisation of gross cost 
contracts makes it clear that what is contracted out by public authorities is the actual 
production of traffic, to the exclusion of the service quality components that make 
public transport more attractive. Most of the responsibility for the marketing function 
and for the general effectiveness of local railways may therefore be considered to 
rest with the PTA. One possible advantage of such a simple assignment is that it 
implies lower barriers to entry in the industry insofar as the risks involved and the 
competencies required from bidders are fairly limited. Considering the low level of 
competition currently characterising local passenger rail operations in Sweden, this 
approach therefore seems to make sense. However, in service industries, it is not that 
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simple to separate service design and marketing from production and efficiency from 
effectiveness. All other things being equal, the service delivery process cannot be 
unbundled and its component functions handled separately without seriously altering 
its effectiveness. 
The Roslagsbanan case, where clear benchmarks and incentive mechanisms 
pertaining to service quality are introduced, presents a different trade-off between the 
advantages and disadvantages just outlined. The emphasis on service quality in this 
case, is unusual. Naturally, the attention awarded to the specification of service 
quality and to its subsequent control considerably increases the costs of regulation. 
On the other hand, although the intended contract also basically consists of a gross 
cost contract, the risks and constraints taken by bidders are already greater than in 
the other Swedish cases. 
The situation in Germany is less categorical. In a number of cases, the domain of the 
assignment covers the widest span of activities. The formal specification of service 
quality is minimal, but the company’s compensation is based on a net cost contract. 
Depending on the relative share of these compensations in its total income, it 
therefore has an incentive to deliver attractive services. In many other cases, on the 
other hand, the operator’s sphere of intervention is considerable but it shares most of 
its responsibilities with the local PTAs. The role of German PTAs is further 
discussed in the next subsection. 
In our view, the system tested in six regions of France in the framework of the 
Haenel experiment is an interesting compromise between the two above models. 
Indeed, this system combines a much wider domain of responsibility for the operator 
(than in the Swedish case), a clearer independence (discretion) of this operator from 
the PTAs (than in many cases in Germany) and a participation of the operator to the 
commercial risks inherent to its operations which should stimulate its performance. 
As already suggested, performance contracts offer a less consistent picture. The 
domain of the assignments given to SNCB and, until 1994, to SNCF under the terms 
of their respective performance contracts is clearly very wide. Both railways take 
responsibility for rail traffic production as well as for its marketing. Their contracts, 
however, make only limited reference to non-output related standards of service 
quality. It is not that service quality goals are being ignored but, for reasons inherent 
to the nature of services, they are often expressed in rather general terms, not in the 
form of precise performance targets. In other words, regulators tend to focus on the 
substantive service, that is, on the essential function of transport operators, at the 
possible expense of other, more peripheral but nevertheless important aspects. 
Assignments and performance criteria are usually classified in broad categories: 
safety, financial accounts, quantitative output, etc. A number of less easily 
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quantifiable aspects are either broadly ignored or they tend to be covered using 
vague guidelines and loose objectives, in lieu of actual service level specifications. 
As a consequence, performance contracts for the most part take the form of codes of 
practice and fail to offer precise service targets. In other words, service quality 
obligations are not absolute, they are essentially expressed in terms of operational 
guidelines. To crown it all, the resources awarded to the companies are insufficiently 
related to the overall attractiveness of the services they deliver. 
In other circumstances, the seemingly "net cost" character of performance contracts 
could be thought to provide a substitute performance drive. This is where other 
contractual dimensions interfere. The commercial responsiveness of the operator 
could be enhanced if the train operator’s reliance on lump-sum subsidies was 
decreased and if its dependence on the proceeds of its sales was consequently more 
significant. However, given the importance of their roles in their respective 
economies and the scale of their operations, it is not simple for regulators in France 
and in Belgium to impose significant and resolute monetary penalties on these 
companies. The risks imposed on the operators would indeed inevitably spill over 
and threaten the quality if not the continuation of their services. 
Swedish regulators partially circumvented this difficulty. They separated their rail 
industry vertically and horizontally and concentrated their subsidisation policy (see 
destination of subsidies) on the development and maintenance of infrastructure as 
well as on local traffic operations, concurrently forcing SJ to exploit main line traffic 
on a fully commercial basis. Every time SJ decides to apply for more State funds, it 
is first required to outbid competitors. The drawbacks of this approach, notably in 
terms of transaction costs, have already been outlined. 
The British model is based on a similar fragmentation of the rail industry but it 
complements the inter-modal competition on which the Swedish approach is based 
with a forceful introduction of intra-modal competition, mainly off the track but also, 
though to a lesser extent, on the track. It seems to surpass all its counterparts in terms 
of risk-sharing/incentive character and discretion (although it relies heavily on users 
committees and on a strong and resolute regulator to ensure an ongoing monitoring 
of service quality), but these results are achieved at the expense of the most 
considerable transaction costs. 
v) Distribution of risks 
The distribution of risks between the operator and the regulator is a fundamental 
aspect of contracts because it largely influences their incentive character. Depending 
on whether the operator bears the costs/reaps the benefits associated with a particular 
outcome, it will be more or less prompted, all other things being equal, to seek the 
achievement of a higher performance. This does not mean that all the risks should 
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systematically be imposed on operators. We already commented on the problems this 
could raise in the cases where, due to the socio-economical importance of the 
contracted assignment, the possible negative consequences of a high power incentive 
on the incumbent operator would inevitably backfire on social planners and the 
population. For that matter, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the risks 
genuinely assumed by the various national railways. Officially, that is, under the 
terms of their performance contracts, SNCB and SNCF, for example, fully support 
both industrial and commercial risks. However, for the reasons just outlined, the 
reality is not as clear-cut as that. 
In other cases, that is, where the risks are less concentrated, the operator’s risk 
aversion imposes two restrictions on the use of high power incentives. First, the risks 
attached to monetary incentives reflect in the compensations claimed by operators. 
This result was established by White and Tough (1995) looking at UK bus 
deregulation. They found that net cost or "minimum subsidy" contracts tended to be 
more expensive for the contracting authorities than gross cost contracts. The reason 
is that, under gross cost contracts, the operator is compensated for its (forecasted or 
actual) total production costs while all the commercial revenue accrue to the 
authority. As a consequence, the operator does not incur commercial risks, unlike in 
case of net cost contract. The case of regional operations in France is particular in 
the sense that SNCF is the incumbent and is therefore ideally positioned to assess the 
commercial and industrial risks involved in each contract. Its risk premium should 
therefore be more limited. Second, higher risks are more likely to discourage smaller 
bidders, which cannot spread the risks involved on a large portfolio of contracts, and 
consequently reduce competition, a hypothesis also verified by White and tough 
(1995) in the case of bus tendering. There again, it is interesting to note that this 
naturally does not apply to SNCF. 
The risks associated with the contractual assignment, be they industrial or 
commercial, do not need to be entirely supported by one party or the other. They may 
be shared between them, as illustrated by the following table. 
Fig.3:  The distribution of production and revenue risks in practice. 
Despite the lack of commercial incentives resulting from gross cost contracts, there 
might thus be ground for the use of gross cost contracts as illustrated by Swedish 
local operations. In the same vein, the above observations raise doubts as to what 
would happen with the dominance of DB AG in the first tenders of regional 
operations organised in Germany, if gross cost tendering were to substitute to net 
cost tendering. In any case, other considerations need to be taken into account as 
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regards the issue of risk distribution. The PTAs’ own risk aversion should not 
represent too much of a problem if we limit this appreciation to exogenous risk 
factors (the risks inherent to any regulatory flaw are a different matter). More 
importantly, as already outlined in previous subsections, where regulators want to 
mitigate the risks assumed by operators, they have two options (other than relying on 
the benevolence of the operator). One is to take on themselves a bigger share of the 
responsibility for service provision (although they are not necessarily better equipped 
or informed to substitute to the operator). The other option is to resort to heavier 
control mechanisms, with all the costs and inefficiencies involved. Finally, as 
already indicated, what matters most, as regards the distribution of risks among the 
parties, is consistency with respect to the two dimensions just discussed, the domain 
of contractual assignment and the discretion of management. The categories and 
levels of risks supported by operators must be related with their effective role in 
taking the decisions influencing the associated benchmarks or outcomes. 
Insofar as production costs are usually easier for operators to control than their 
revenue, production risks should increasingly be supported by operators rather than 
by the contracting authorities. However, if this is what they want, authorities should 
beware of the impact the autonomy granted to infrastructure managers could have on 
the costs of this option. The more deregulated the exploitation of infrastructure, the 
more uncertainty traffic operators will face as to the level of network access charges, 
the higher the risk premium they will require from contracting authorities. 
vi) Duration of contracts 
In an "ideal" world, that is (in a purely economic perspective), a world without 
uncertainty, complete and infinite contracts would be conceivable. Reality is of 
course different so that there is ground for not allowing the duration of contracts to 
be too long. The difficulty to plan for future contingencies increases with the term of 
the agreement. Because bidders are risk averse, there is an upper limit to the contract 
duration they are ready to accept and/or there is a positive relation between this 
dimension and the compensations they claim, which includes a risk-premium. 
Longer contracts also mean more risk for the contracting authorities. The evolution 
of passenger rail transport operators is one of the uncertainties regulators must take 
into account. The intrinsic costs of potential bidders and their managerial abilities 
may change over the years. Therefore, the organisation of regular invitations to 
tenders is a way for regulators and PTAs to contract with the best operator at each 
point in time. 
In a similar vein, it is clear that when the contracting period is shorter, it is possible 
for regulators or transport services purchasers to get away with simpler and less 
systematic contracts. Similarly, shorter contract durations are easier to enforce when 
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the scale of operations is more limited. The reason for this is that the inherent 
switching costs tend to be more limited. 
In contrast, where prospective bids are more distant, more exhaustive contracts may 
be expected. And uncertainty is not the only reason for this. In fact, the duration of 
contracts may also contribute to the alleviation of moral hazard. To a certain extent, 
the contemplation of upcoming bids may be expected to deter the opportunistic 
exploitation of possible contractual flaws and/or shortcomings. Because franchising 
is essentially used as a way to substitute competition for the market (off the tracks) to 
competition in the market (on the tracks) where the latter is deemed infeasible or 
undesirable (a point first made by Demsetz, 1968), contracts must expire with 
enough regularity to limit monopoly exploitation in the meantime. The operating 
company knows that its competitive position in the next tender should be conditioned 
by its commitment to service quality delivery in the first place. Unless it considers 
compensations for the service in question to be too low, it therefore has a clear 
incentive to do a good job so as to take on future bids with an untarnished reputation. 
Uncertainty and moral hazard considerations are not the only issues, however. A 
variety of other arguments may have an impact on the optimal contract duration. 
First, in a market where requisite skills are significant and competitors may 
(therefore) be scarce, recurrent calls for tender are a way to keep competition alive 
by arousing the interest of potential bidders in the sector. In other words, shorter 
contract durations may help to maintain the "critical mass" of tendered out operations 
needed to uphold a reasonable amount of competition in the field. 
Short-term contracts also present a number of disadvantages. First of all, the 
organisation of tenders may be particularly costly for the PTAs as well as for the 
industry itself, insofar as bids may notably require the organisation of customer 
surveys and other market studies. Second, the reluctance of operators to invest in 
durable assets is only partially addressed by the disintegration of the industry. When 
it comes to hardware, that is, rolling stocks, stations, depots and other tangibles, the 
solution usually consists in the operator using the equipment provided by the 
contracting party or any other lessor. Sell-back clauses are another possibility. 
However, no comparable arrangement is available when it comes to "intangibles". 
Little can be done to help operators fully recouping for the efforts and investments 
they incur, for example, to build a strong image, to market their services, to study the 
tastes and expectations of their prospects, to recruit and to train their personnel, etc. 
So, depending on the incumbent’s motivation and confidence in regard of future bids, 
service quality might also suffer as a result of shorter contract durations. 
To conclude, the duration of contracts could, in our opinion, be used more 
systematically in order to stimulate higher quality standards. We came across 
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contracts whose renewal by tacit agreement was conditioned to the operator 
honouring certain provisions of its contract. Provided that such a scheme is clearly 
specified in their invitation to tender, the contracting authorities could extend this 
principle by ensuring to the operator a longer contract duration if it achieves higher 
service standards than imposed by its contractual minimum targets, for example.. 
vii) Destination of subsidies 
There is a major difference between the Swedish and the British models with respect 
to the destination of subsidies inside their respective passenger rail transport 
systems. In the Swedish case, State funds are essentially directed to the fully State-
owned infrastructure company, Banverket. The idea pursued by Swedish regulators is 
to allow for lower access charges, to limit accordingly the compensations required by 
SJ, and to let the national train operating company operate main-line traffic 
according to market principles, pretty much like the road users with which it 
competes. This allows Swedish regulators on the one hand, to confine the explicit 
control of SJ to the strict minimum, which already turned out to enhance its 
industrial and commercial dynamism, and, on the other hand, to concentrate their 
regulatory control on Banverket, the definitely and inevitably monopolistic manager 
of the railway infrastructure. 
The approach adopted in Great Britain is completely different. Railtrack, now a joint 
stock company, is supposed to cover its costs and to remunerate its shareholders 
essentially with the proceeds of the access charges paid by the TOCs. Its dependence 
on State funds is therefore strictly limited. All other circumstances being equal, this 
should result in higher rates of subsidisation at the traffic operation level, which is 
not necessarily desirable since this is where commercial acumen is the most needed. 
Note, however, that other circumstances are not equal, i.e. the subsidisation of 
passenger rail transport is lower in Great Britain. 
In any case, as a result of the privatisation of Railtrack, British regulators are facing 
a serious challenge. As a private business, Railtrack certainly has an incentive to be 
cost-efficient. But since it is a private monopoly, it will requires recurrent regulatory 
scrutiny to ensure that it does not abuse its monopoly power, that is, that the fees it 
charges to its clients (i.e. the TOCs) in exchange for their access to its infrastructure 
are appropriate (i.e. allow no more than a fair remuneration of its capital) in regard 
of the investments made in their development and maintenance. 
Member States' practices also differ significantly in the way subsidies are allocated 
among categories of traffic. While in Belgium public grants for traffic operations are 
paid to the national railway company in a relatively undifferentiated way, other 
countries have taken advantage of their regionalization of regulatory control and 
service provision to substantially improve the transparency of their subsidisation 
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schemes. The result is a much clearer identification of the costs associated with the 
different services provided. 
To conclude the present section on how the various dimensions characterising the 
regulation of passenger rail throughout the European Union interact with one 
another, let us summarise in just one flow chart the most important insights gained 
from the comparative analysis of the distinctive models currently existing. In the 
figure below, the seven regulatory dimensions just discussed appear in sharp-angle 
rectangles. The leftwards-leaning diamonds are used to feature the main possible 
costs and drawbacks of the various models examined and the rightwards-leaning one, 
their hopeful benefit. The smooth-angle rectangles are there to help clarify some of 
the links established. Finally, each of the arrows linking the elements of the chart is 
associated with a sign reflecting the direction of the illustrated relationship. 
Fig. 4: A comprehensive framework for analysing passenger rail reforms -  
 The 7 Ds of passenger rail contracting 
4. Concluding comments
In order to better understand the main constraints facing regulators in the design of 
optimal organisational structures and regulatory arrangements for passenger transport 
industries, we compared the different regimes examined in this study, in order to 
build a comprehensive framework for the analysis of alternative models. Our 
framework identifies seven relevant dimensions, which are all connected to one 
another in a complex web of interactions. Interestingly, this framework, which was 
built on investigations conducted in the passenger rail sector, is perfectly applicable 
to other public transport modes, as they tend to be based on simpler models. 
Depending on the circumstances, each of the identified dimensions entails a variety 
of costs and drawbacks as well as different advantages and opportunities, which need 
to be weighed against one another in order to determine the most appropriate 
regulatory regime for a given situation in time and space. Time indeed is of the 
utmost importance in the current context of change and policies that seem wise in 
today's circumstances may be less so in a few years time, as the industry restructures 
and learns to put up with more complex assignments and higher revenue risks. Where 
the idea is to rely on the introduction of market forces to improve the performance of 
public transport systems, a phased approach to these reforms is essential. If one 
wishes to allow the emergence of a sufficient number of competent and financially 
sound entrepreneurs on the market, it is necessary to proceed progressively while at 
the same time keeping company concentrations under check. 
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The risks and informational costs involved in resorting more systematically to 
incentive mechanisms in controlling the performance of passenger transport firms, 
appear to be the main reasons for their limited utilisation. One topical direction for 
further research in the field should therefore consist in analysing more thoroughly 
the relationship(s) that exist between the incentives imposed on operators and the 
nature and levels of risks they may be expected to take on against a reasonable 
premium. 
As outlined in the framework of this research, there exists a variety of ways to 
mitigate the significance of the risks imposed on a given operator while at the same 
time ensuring that she faces sufficient performance incentives. The disintegration of 
passenger rail industries and the use of fairly limited contract durations should have 
the desired effect if they allow transport operators to spread the risks they incur on a 
few contracts instead of one. However, these prospects entail difficulties elsewhere 
in the system, in the form of increased transaction costs, for example. In any case, 
minimising the overall level of risk to be distributed among the parties, requires that 
the sharing out of the various tasks making up passenger transport provision, among 
regulators, planners, and operators be fine-tuned in relation with these parties’ 
respective access to the relevant information. 
One of the most challenging and ground-breaking aspects of future assessments are 
bound to lie in the assessment of the sometimes considerable transaction and 
coordination costs inherent in each regulatory scheme. Where these costs somehow 
translated into monetary expenses, as the recruitment of additional staff or an 
increase in the fees paid to consultants would, their evaluation will essentially be a 
matter of patient and diligent inquiry. But where they have mostly been supported by 
customers in the form of extra hassles, delays, missed connections, etc., their 
assessment will obviously require more creativity. 
For the relative liberalisation of the sector to be a success in the longer run, more 
attention also needs to be devoted to issues of market structure: concentration, 
collusion, barriers to entry and exit, etc. The natural monopoly properties of public 
transport and other market failures that characterise their functioning call for 
specific concepts and tools for dealing with them. Regulators ought to be able not 
only to monitor and react effectively to all the possible abuses that might take place 
in the industries considered but also to anticipate and, to a certain extent, influence 
their evolution in the most appropriate way. 
Some important issues here are the following: How to structure the industry and 
organise its functioning so as to maximise its competitiveness? How to define a 
market-share cap in relation to a given territory? How to encourage operators to 
consider call for tenders in foreign countries and to place a bid? (Signals issued by 
the authority, compensation of bidders for their participation, etc.) How could 
authorities co-operate with one another in these fields (sharing of relevant 
23
information, creation of networks of authorities engaging in benchmarking together, 
etc.)? 
As passenger rail restructuring proceeds, data series long enough to reflect its impact 
on the industry's performance should become available in those countries where it 
has led to significant institutional reshuffles. This should allow researchers to carry 
out ex-post cross-country evaluations of the emerging models. Given the remarkable 
diversity of the national approaches to be compared with one another, such 
endeavours should be sufficiently broad in scope to encompass all the relevant costs 
and benefits. We hope this ex-ante analysis will provide fertile and thought-
provoking ground for future evaluations by highlighting and structuring the main 
issues at stake. 
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Figure 2-A: An institutional and organisational comparison of five European passenger rail industries (Part A) 
Decentralisation
of regulatory control 
Disintegration 
of the industry 
Domain 
of the contractual assignment 
Duration 
of contracts 
Belgium The regulation and supervision of rail 
transport is a federal competence. 
Accounting separation of infrastructure 
management and traffic operations.
Access to the network for the int'l 
operations of international groupings. 
Theoretically the widest conceivable: 
SNCB's role in defining the country's 
rail transport policy is considerable. 
SNCB's performance contracts are 
valid for periods of 5 years. 
France In 1997, six "experimental" regions 
took over from the State the 
supervision and financing of passenger 
rail services on their territory and 
contracted them out to SNCF. 
Organisational separation of 
infrastructure (Réseau Ferré de France). 
Access to the network for the 
international operations of international 
groupings. 
National level: same as in Belgium. 
Experimental regions: the regions 
determine, in consultation with SNCF, 
the planning of passenger rail services 
and their coordination with the other 
modes. 
National level: No formal contract at 
present; duration of last performance 
contracts: 5 years. 
Experimental regions: 3 years. 
Germany The financing and supervision of 
regional traffic operations has been the 
responsibility of the Länder since 
1996.
Organisational separation (soon to be 
institutional) of DB AG. Access to the 
network for the international operations 
of international groupings and for 
regional operations on a reciprocity 
basis. 
National level: same as in Belgium and 
France. 
Länder's level: same as in France. 
National level: no formal contract. 
Länder's level: in the current transition 
period, from 1 year (temporary regime) 
to 15 years where justified by the 
investments planned by the operator. 
Sweden Regional traffic operations have been 
the responsibility of the counties ever 
since the end of the 80's. 
Institutional separation of infrastructure 
(BV) and traffic operations (SJ and 
competitors). Access to the network for 
the international operations of 
international groupings and for 
subsidised regional operations. 
National level (main line services):
Considerable insofar as SJ basically 
operates on commercial principles. 
However, SJ does not control 
infrastructure planning. 
Regional level: as a rule, very limited. 
National level (main line services):
No formal contract in most cases; 
durations of 1 to 5 years for those 
services that are subsidised. 
Regional level: From half a year (with 
possibility of tacit renewal) to 5 years. 
Great 
Britain 
Despite the fragmentation of the 
British rail industry, its regulatory 
supervision remains fairly centralised. 
Far-reaching vertical and horizontal 
institutional separation of the industry 
with open tendering procedures for the 
resulting traffic concessions. 
Considerable in theory; more limited 
with respect to the planning of those 
services whose commercial prospects 
are poor. 
As a rule, 7 years. Up to 15 years in a 
few cases, on the ground of the 
investments involved.  
Figure 2-B: An institutional and organisational comparison of five European passenger rail industries (Part B) 
Discretion 
of management 
Distribution
of risks 
Destination
of subsidies 
Belgium Substantial: performance contracts set a few output 
targets; other provisions consist of fairly subjective 
guidelines. However, SNCB is fully State-owned and 
unforeseen political interference already occurred. 
Theoretically, SNCB bears both production and 
revenue risks ("net cost contract"). However, it is a 
State-owned company. Besides, its performance 
contract does not include any penalties. 
State financing of infrastructure development and 
maintenance. Supplementary subsidisation of 
domestic passenger services with very little 
differentiation between them. 
France National level: same as in Belgium "on average" 
(more outcome-based objectives and process-related 
targets in the first performance contract but no 
contract at present). 
Experimental regions: too soon to judge; but likely to 
differ across regions. 
National level: same as in Belgium. 
Experimental regions: SNCF bears the production 
risks and shares the revenue risks with the regions. 
Besides, a number of service quality standards are 
associated with specific incentives. 
At present, same kind of scheme as in Belgium. 
However, a shift of emphasis towards traffic 
operations in the allocation of State funds is under 
study. The subsidisation of regional services is 
clearly distinct. 
Germany National level (main line services):
DB AG basically operates on commercial principles. 
Länder's level: the ongoing involvement of local 
public authorities in operations planning, inter-modal 
coordination and service design is more or less 
institutionalised. Moreover, the use of contracts is not 
generalised yet. 
National level (main line services):
DB AG basically operates on commercial principles. 
Länder's level: in more complex networks, regional 
traffic operators bear both the production and the 
revenue risks, but a number of local small scale 
railways also operate under cost-plus types of 
regimes. 
As a rule, access charges are set to cover total 
infrastructure costs, which involves higher 
compensations for traffic operations. However, the 
Federal State and the Länder also contribute to the 
financing of new infrastructure developments. The 
subsidisation of regional services is clearly distinct. 
Sweden National level (main line services):
SJ basically operates on commercial principles. 
Regional level: The use of contracts is not 
generalised yet, which leaves local services open to 
ongoing political interference; where contracts exist, 
discretion is barely an issue given the limited scope 
of the assignment. 
National level (main line services):
SJ basically operates on commercial principles; 
subsidised services are based on "net cost" contracts. 
Regional level: all existing regional contracts are 
"gross cost" but may be supplemented with quality 
incentives; in the absence of delegation, cost-plus 
subsidisation is self-evident. 
State financing of infrastructure development and 
maintenance. Supplementary subsidisation of non-
profitable (mostly regional) passenger services. 
Great 
Britain 
In theory, passenger rail franchises are basically run 
on commercial principles. However, the privatisation 
and the fragmentation of the rail industry finally led 
to a rather extensive specification of service. And 
more regulatory adjustments might be needed. 
Operators usually bear all the risks inhering in their 
activity. Besides, a number of contracts include 
additional penalty schemes. However, possibilities of 
attempts to renegotiate financial conditions before the 
end of their contract remain a matter of great concern.
Limited public financing of infrastructure 
development and renewal. Selective financing of 
traffic operations based on the amount 
claimed/offered by the winning bidder. Marked 
downward trend. 
Fig. 3: The distribution of production and revenue risks in practice 
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